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Abstract 
This paper analyzes an appropriate methodology for studying discriminatory credit rationing 
in rural credit programs with fixed interest rates. The paper demonstrates that in order to 
analyze credit discrimination one should have a well·defined loan demand and supply model. 
The criteria by which loan applications are accepted or rejected should be explicitly 
incorporated into the analysis. The paper also demonstrates that the estimation of the 
model should consider not only data on loans granted but also on loans rejected. Finally, 
the empirical analysis implemented in this study shows that this loan demand and supply 
model is quite adequate for analyzing the discriminatory policies followed for a rural credit 
program in Portugal after the 1974 Revolution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-price rationing in credit markets, as a substantive issue of theory and policy, is 
a subject not only of primary importance, but of considerable controversy. During the past 
three decades many low income countries (hereafter called LICs) created a variety of 
specialized agricultural lending institutions organized to provide to predetermined group(s) 
of rural producers, regions, and/ or agricultural activities with agricultural loans at subsidized 
rates of interest. It was believed that by providing targeted credit to some group( s) of rural 
producers (or regions) they could be induced to use more modem technologies to accelerate 
agricultural growth. Contrary to these expectations, however, available empirical evidence 
suggests that most rural credit programs implemented in LICs have highly discriminated 
against small producers, with credit often diverted to the largest and most influential 
producers, thus worsening rural income distribution [Gonzalez-Vega, 1984b ]. 
The financial market literature has attempted to explain discriminatory credit 
rationing by considering "legal" and "social constraints, high screening costs, and most 
convincingly, asymmetry of information in credit markets (for details, see Hodgman [1960], 
Jaffee and Modigliani [1969], Jaffee and Russell [1976], Azzi and Cox [1976], Baltensperger 
[1978], Keeton [1979], Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Devinney [1986], and Bester [1987]). 
This literature, however, has not explained how the credit rationing process takes 
place. Presumably, it is considered that the discriminatory process is carried out by random 
rejection. However, as empirical evidence indicates, this is clearly unrealistic. 
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More recent efforts made to explain the discriminatory process in rural financial 
markets have identified cheap-credit policies and high operational costs per unit of money 
loaned as some of the most important factors causing the disappointing results observed in 
rural credit programs.1 It has been argued that cheap-credit policies tend to create excess 
demand thereby forcing agricultural lenders to ration credit through non-price mechanisms. 
Since operational costs and associated risks in servicing large rural producers are lower than 
those associated with small producers, the agricultural lender is motivated to favor the 
largest farmers in order to reduce per unit lending costs [Gonzalez-Vega, 1984a]. 
Traditionally, empirical studies have established discrimination against some class( es) 
of borrowers (or regions, or agricultural activity, etc.) by checking whether the dummy 
variable for that class of borrowers (or region) is significant in a linear discriminant, probit, 
or logit function. However, if the dummy variable coefficient for the selected class of 
borrowers is negative and statistically significant in a discriminant function, this cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of discrimination since linear discriminant, probit, or logit models 
are reduced (single equation) form variety. Hence, it is not possible to determine whether 
the dummy variable for some class of borrowers (or region) is negative because of the 
demand or the supply function. 
This can be better explained through an example. Let's assume that we attempt to 
determine if a class of borrowers denoted as IND has been discriminated against in a typical 
credit program by checking the sign and statistical significance of the dummy variable IND 
1For an extensive analysis of the impact of cheap-credit policies on rural credit 
markets cfr. Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke (1984). 
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in a probit model. Let's assume that the coefficient obtained for this class of borrowers int 
he probit model is negative and statistically significant. Hence, the probit analysis concludes 
that the IND borrowers have been discriminated against in the credit market. Now, let's 
assume that we also attempt to analyze if this class of borrowers (IND) have been 
discriminated against by estimating the following simultaneous equation model: 
WAN DEMAND: LD=a.0 +a.lND+a.,;K1 +a.3r+~1 
WAN SUPPLY: L8 =P0 +PlND+P2X2+P3r+~2 
(1.1) 
where IND is the dummy variable corresponding to the class of borrowers under study; r 
is the loan rate of interest; X1 and X2 are vectors of explanatory variables; as and ps are 
parameters; and llt and Jl2 are disturbance errors. Assume that, after solving the model 
specified above by appropriate methods, a 1 is negative and statistically significant in the 
demand function, but P1 is not statistically different from zero i.e., IND borrowers demand 
less than other classes, but in terms of granted loans they are not different from other 
groups. In other words, IND borrowers are not experiencing discrimination in the market, 
contrary to the discriminant analysis report. Consequently, in order to analyze discriminato-
ry credit rationing in rural credit markets one has to have a well defined loan demand and 
loan supply model. 
The main objective of this paper is to discuss appropriate procedures for analyzing 
discriminatory credit rationing in rural credit markets with non-negotiable (or exogenous) 
interest rates. The specific objective is to analyze if there was any discriminatory credit 
rationing in lending activities of a Portuguese rural credit program (the Fundo de 
Melboramento Agricola) after the 1974 Revolution which changed from a dictatorial to a 
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more democratic (socialist oriented) regime. The analysis is carried out through a loan 
demand and loan supply model with explicit consideration of a non-negotiable interest rate 
(imposed from outside), and the criteria by which credit applications were accepted or 
rejected. 
I. THE MODEL 
The model considered in this study draws on that of Nelson [1977] for labor markets, 
and Maddala and Trost [1982] for loan markets. The model applies to non-negotiated 
agricultural loans where the rate of interest for each loan transaction is not determined by 
the intersection of the demand and supply functions but is exogenously imposed from 
outside. We will assume that the ith loan applicant demand an amount !;0 at the fixed 
interest rate, r. The agricultural lender, on the other hand, after evaluating the applicant's 
available informational set, will decide on the maximum loan amount 1;5 that he/she is 
willing to offer this customer (Aguilera, 1990). If I; 0 s I; 5, the loan transaction will take 
place. If it is not, the loan request will be rejected. The model may be represented as 
follows: 
(1.2) 
S I L, = P2 x2l + cx2r + 112 (1.3) 
i = 1~ .... ~n (applicants), 
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where L1° is the loan request from the ith applicant; I; 5 is the maximum amount that the 
lender is willing to offer to the ith applicant given the available information on that 
borrower; r is the fixed interest rate; ~ is a K-element vector of observable explanatory 
variables; and p,1 and p,2 are random disturbances that follow a bivariate binormal 
distribution with zero mean vector and unknown variances and covariances, a1, az, and a12• 
Both disturbances are assumed to be independent of ~-
The criteria by which the lender decides to grant or reject a loan may be represented 
as follows: 
(1.4) 
where L1 is the observed loan amount. The criteria function (1.4) defines two sets of 
observations: no, the subset of the rejected loans; and the subset n1, the subset of granted 
loans. Since the systems of equations (1.2)-(1.4) is a simultaneous equations model with 
censoring,2 an identification problem arises. Given the fact that the model is similar to that 
of Nelson [1977], the necessary condition for identification of the system requires one 
restriction among the set {32, a2, a12• For example, if some element of {32 is restricted to zero, 
the necessary condition is satisfied, even in the case that the corresponding element in {31 
is non-zero. Likewise, restricting a12 to zero is sufficient for identification (for details see 
Nelson, 1977). 
2Notice that ~sis never observed. 
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The more appropriate estimation procedure of the model is the Maximum Likelihood 
technique. Following Nelson [1977], the model may be estimated as follows: Since, the 
data on the amount a loan applicant requests is usually available, and assuming that the 
necessary conditions for identification are satisfied, then the demand function may be 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The supply function (1.3), in turn, may be 
estimated with a simple probit model with a known threshold. From criteria function (1.4) 
we know that whenever L5 ;:::L0 the loan is granted. Hence, by replacing Equation (1.3) for 
for the model may be written as 
(1.5) 
where the first product is over all observations for denied loans, and the second is for all 
observations for granted loans; and <I> is the unit normal distribution function. 
The likelihood function 1.5 suggests that if the loan amount demanded is not 
considered in the estimation of the discriminant function, a specification error will arise. 
It also suggests that, unlike the case of the normal probit model, since the amount of loan 
demanded (lP) is observed, we will be able to estimate a2; the reciprocal of the coefficient 
II. THE DATA 
The data for this study are described in detail in Mansinho [1990]. The data for this 
study consist of 5,980 loan applications during 1974-1979 frofll the Fundo de Melhoramento 
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Agricola (hereafter called FMA) statistics, a classic supply leading agricultural credit 
program managed through the Ministry of Agriculture in Portugal from the late 1940s to 
1979. The period 1974-1979 was chosen to investigate the impact on the loan portfolio of 
the economic and political changes that occurred in Portugal after the 1974 Revolution. 
The data terminates in 1979 the last year that the FMA operated. Table 1 presents the 
definition of the variable used in this study. 
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VARIABLE 
INT 
LOAND 
WANS 
Table 1 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THIS STUDY 
DESCRIPTION 
Interest rate on loan 
Amount in Contos of loan demanded (basis 1976). 
Dummy = 1 if loan is granted 
TYPE OF BORROWERS ............................................. . 
AGRE Dummy = 1 if member of the agrarian reform sector 
COOP Dummy = 1 if cooperative 
IND Dummy = 1 if individual 
COLLA.'fERAL ..................................................... . 
MORTG Dummy = 1 if mortgage collateral 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT ............................................. . 
SOIL Dummy = 1 if soil preparation or irrigation 
FRUIT Dummy = 1 if fruits 
LIVEST Dummy = 1 if livestock 
CUL Dummy = 1 if horticulture 
INDUS Dummy = 1 if agroindustry food crops 
REGION .......................................................... . 
NOR Til Dummy = 1 if north 
SOUTII Dummy = 1 if south 
CEN'fER Dummy = 1 if center 
USB Dummy = 1 if lisbon 
TIME DElAY IN WAN DISBURSEMENT .............................. . 
DELA.UT Number of months to disburse a loan. 
III. TilE RESULTS 
The estimated demand and supply model is the following: 
Demand: LOAND = (3 0 + PlNT+ P:zAGRE + f3 3COOP+ f3 4MORT+ 
f3 5SOIL + f3 6FRUIT+ P,LJVEST + PgiNDUS + (1.6) 
P/IORTHP 10 +SOUTH+ P11CEN + P12DELAUT+ J.L 1 
Supply: LOANS= a0 + «lNT + a2LOAND + a~GRE + a4COOP 
+ a5MORT+ a6SOIL + a1FRUIT+apvEST+ ac}NDUS (1.7) 
+ «u,NORTH + a. 11SOUTH + a. 12CEN + J.L2 
where LOANS is the dummy variable defined as follows 
{ = 1, if loan is granted WANS 
= 0, otherwise 
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The variables are defined in Table 1. The results of the demand and supply model with 
exogenous interest rates are set forth in Table 2. The supply equation was estimated by 
probit model. The demand equation, in tum, was estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The Results 
The interest rate coefficient (INT) shows, as expected, a positive and highly 
significant sign (t-ratio 18.5, significant at 1 percent level) in the supply function, and a 
negative but insignificant sign in the demand function. The insignificant sign for INT in the 
demand function is not surprising if we consider the subsidized and non-negotiable nature 
of the fixed interest rate in this credit program: The borrower 'must' accept the offered 
interest rate. 
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The negative and significant sign (t-ratio -2.3 significant at 5 percent level) for 
LOANS (the requested loan amount) indicates that applicants demanding large loan sizes 
were discriminated against in the program. This result makes sense if we consider that the 
socialist government after the 1974 Revolution was more inclined to favor small rural 
producers. 
The sign obtained for MORTG in both the supply and demand function provide us 
with an interesting result. Contrary to our expectations, the applicant's ability to provide 
mortgage as collateral, instead of crop lien pledges, is negatively correlated with the 
probability of getting a loan. This result suggests that mortgage collateral was not 
considered by the lender as a risk-reducing mechanism. It appears to be that the ability of 
providing mortgage as collateral was considered by the lender as a sign of high income than 
a risk-reducing mechanism. The positive correlation between income and the ability of 
providing mortgage collateral is reflected in the positive sign obtained for MORTG in the 
demand function. Thus, if MORTG is a proxy for the applicants' income, we may conclude 
that large-income loan applicants were discriminated against in this credit program. This 
result is perfectly consistent with the socialist orientation of the post-revolutionary regime 
in Portugal. 
Another interesting result is provided by the negative and significant sign obtained 
for DELAUT in the demand function. This indicates that delays in loan disbursement 
created a negative incentive on the demand side. Delaying the loan disbursement can be 
interpreted as increasing borrowers' transaction costs. Thus, it is quite reasonable a negative 
sign appears for DELAUT in the demand function. 
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Discriminatory Credit Rationing by Type of Borrower. 
The negative and significant sign obtained for COOP in the supply function, and its 
positive and significant sign in the demand function suggests that during the post-revolution 
period agricultural farmers associated with private farmer cooperatives were highly 
discriminated against by the FMA's management. Agrarian reform beneficiaries, on the 
other hand, were highly favored during this same period of time. These results make sense 
if we consider the nature of the new regime established after the 1974 Revolution in 
Portugal. 
Discriminatory Credit Rationing by Type of Activity. 
The signs and statistical significance obtained for agricultural activity variables allow 
us to conclude that the FMA tended to favor soil preparation and irrigation, livestock, and 
industrial food crop investment. In fact, the sign and significance of the coefficients for 
SOIL, LIVEST, and INDUS are all positive and highly significant, while horticulture, and 
fruit activities tended to be discriminated against. 
Discriminatory Credit Rationing by Region. 
The analysis of the sign and significance permit us to conclude that the FMA credit 
program tended to favor applicants from the north, while applicants from the south (a 
region with the larger concentration of larger farms) tended to be discriminated against. 
Effectively, the sign obtained for NORTH in the supply function is positive and moderately 
significant (t-ratio 1.7, significant at 10 percent level). The sign obtained for SOUTH in the 
supply function, in tum, is negative and highly significant (t-ratio -1.9, significant at 5 percent 
level). 
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Table 2 
ESTIMATES OF LOAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODEL WITH FIXED INTEREST 
RATE 
Pooled time series cross-section data: Fundo de Me/horamentoAgricola (FMA) Portugal 1974-1979. 
VARIABLE 
INTERCEPT 
INT 
LOANS 
MORTG 
DELAUT 
TYPE OF BORROWERS 
AGRE 
COOP 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT 
SOIL 
FRUIT 
LIVEST 
INDUS 
REGION 
NORTH 
SOUTH 
CENTER 
SUPPLY (PROBIT) 
(LOANS = 1 if loan is granted 
-1.56 ( -2.2)* 
0.002( 18.5)** 
-0.02 ( -2.3)* 
-0.16 ( -3.9)** 
0.12 ( 2.4)* 
-0.40 ( -5.6)** 
0.78 ( 9.0)** 
0.09 ( 0.8) 
0.69 ( 7.3)** 
1.09 ( 6.9)** 
0.10 ( 1.7) 
-0.06 ( -1.9)* 
0.02 ( 0.3) 
Total number of observations = 5,980 
Number of Loan Applicants Rejected = 2,319 
Number of Loan Applicants Accepted = 3,661 
RSQ = R-square between observed and predicted 
F-STAT = F-Statistic 
DEMAND (OLS) 
-0.01 ( -0.1) 
-0.001 ( -0.6) 
0.22 ( 5.5)** 
-0.01 ( -2.3)* 
0.14 ( 3.4)** 
0. 78 ( 3.9)** 
0.36 ( 3.4)** 
0.59 ( 3.6)** 
0.34 ( 2.3)* 
5.20 ( 7.3)** 
-0.03 ( -0.3) 
-0.13 ( -2.0)* 
-0.29 ( -3.6)** 
RSQ = .24 
F-STAT. = 152.9 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios for the supply function, and exact t-ratios for the demand function. 
** significant at 1 percent level. 
* significant at 5 percent level. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper argued that in order to analyze discriminatory credit rationing in 
rural credit programs, one should have a well-defined demand and supply model, which 
should be estimated by using not only data on loans granted, but also on loans denied. 
Moreover, the estimation of the supply function should be estimated considering the loan 
amount demanded as an additional explanatory variable, otherwise there would be a 
specification error in the model. 
The paper illustrates the loan demand and loan supply model with non-negotiable 
loan contracts using loan information provided by a Portuguese agricultural development 
institution, the Fundo de Melhoramento Agricola during the period 1974-1979. The 1974 
Revolution changed a dictatorial regime to a more democratic (socialist oriented) regime 
with a completely different social and economic perspective than the old regime. 
The results show a clear discrimination against large farmers, farmers associated with 
private cooperatives, horticulture and fruits activities, and applicants from southern Portugal. 
These results reflect the socialist character of the new regime established in Portugal during 
the period under study. 
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